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Abstract. When developing complex software systems, one of the most signifi-
cant challenges is to make sure that the customer and developer agree on the re-
quirements of the system. By using executable models early in the development
process, a higher degree of confidence can be gained in the system design and
misunderstandings or ambiguous functional requirements can be avoided. This
paper presents an industrial case of a communication protocol between two parts
of a self-defense system used on-board fighter aircraft. An executable model of
both systems were created using the Vienna Development Method (VDM), and
exercised using many scenarios to cover different corner cases. This was done as
an alternative to analysing all the scenarios by hand, which would be much more
time consuming and far more error prone. The results of the scenario based tests
were used to communicate with the customer and ensure that agreement of the
requirements was reached.
Keywords: VDM, industrial application, fighter aircraft, requirements, executable
model, lightweight formal analysis
1 Introduction
When developing complex software systems, one of the most significant challenges is
the communication between the customer and the software engineers implementing the
system. The customer is the domain expert who possesses detailed knowledge of the
domain in which the system will operate, and it is imperative that the software engineer
obtains the knowledge needed to solve the task at hand. Missing or ambiguous systems
requirements is a very common cause of project delays since customer and developer
do not share the same view of the system under development. Errors in communication
can lead to crucial defects in the final system – something that must be avoided at all
costs in a safety-critical system like the one presented here.
The most commonly used means of communication is natural language, which un-
fortunately brings the potential for errors such as subtle misunderstandings and ambigu-
ously described functionality. To solve these issues, formal methods have been applied
to several industrial cases over the last 20 years [28]. By utilising formally described
system models, important details of the system can be described rigorously while a
higher level of abstraction can be applied to less important details of the system.
Executable subsets of many formal specification languages exists, enabling the de-
veloper to show the customer running scenarios of the proposed system – this is a great
way of communicating the technical solution to a less-technical adept customer and
agree on the systems design. The use of executable system specification has been sub-
ject to much debate in the past [10,8]. One of the goals of the case study presented
here, was to examine the benefits of creating an executable formal model specifying
the functional behaviour of the system and using lightweight formal methods analysis
principles to gain insight in the system-level properties.
In the software industry, the Unified Modeling Language (UML) [19] has seen wide
usage, as a means to provide an architectural and functional overview of the software.
UML models can even be executable, allowing domain experts to do scenario based
tests of the model – unfortunately, this requires very refined models which are very
close to the final implementation, hence removing the advantage of using abstraction in
the modelling phase. Abstraction is a key element – not only when applying lightweight
formal methods analysis as described in this case study – but in software development
in general [12].
In order to evaluate the use of lightweight analysis techniques, an executable model
of a self-defense system used on-board fighter aircraft was developed using the formal
method Vienna Development Method (VDM) [3]. Using this approach has the advan-
tage of providing executable models while maintaining the ability to apply a higher
level of abstraction to details not needed to describe the functionality of the system.
This system level model was used as a means of communication between domain ex-
perts and the group of software engineers implementing the system, when developing
an expansion to a communication protocol between two subsystems. The case study
presented here is part of the Industrial PhD project described in [27].
Initially, an overview of the formal method VDM as well as the different tool sup-
port available is given in Section 2. An overview of the self-defense system used as a
case study is given in Section 3, followed by a description of the VDM model and the
test setup in Section 4. The results obtained from the study are presented in Section 5,
followed by concluding remarks as well as a description of future work in Section 6.
2 VDM Modelling Languages and Tool Support
VDM is a collection of techniques to formally specify and develop software. VDM
originates from IBM’s Laboratories in Vienna in the 1970s. The very first language
supported by the VDM method was called Vienna Definition Language (VDL), which
evolved into the specification language VDM-SL [4] which has been ISO standard-
ised [11]. Over the years, extensions have been defined to model object-orientation
(VDM++ [5]) and distributed real-time systems (VDM-RT [18,24]). Two alternative
tools exists; the commercial tool VDMTools [6] and the open source initiative Over-
ture [20].
Data in VDM models can be described using simple abstract data types such as
natural numbers, booleans and characters, as well as product and unions types and col-
lection types such as sets, sequences and mappings. The system state can be described
using state in VDM-SL and instance variables in VDM++ and VDM-RT,
the value of which can be restricted by invariants. To modify the state of the system,
operations can be defined either explicitly by imperative statements, or implicitly by
pre- and post-conditions. Functions which cannot use or modify the state can be de-
fined in a similar fashion.
VDM has been used in several successful industrial applications e.g. [15] – exam-
ples of two recent applications in the Japanese industry is the TradeOne system devel-
oped by CSK systems for the Japanese stock exchange [5] and the FeliCa contactless
chip firmware [14,13]. Most of these applications have the common goal of providing
rapid feedback on requirements and design early in the development cycle, just like the
project described here.
The purpose of the model was to describe the system functionality and test a mul-
titude of combinations of system state and input, and not to test synchronization of a
concurrent system. Hence, for the case study presented here the sequential version of
VDM++ was chosen, to be able to describe an object-oriented architecture of the system
without introducing the added complexity of a concurrent model. In order to permit the
use of scenario-based tests, only the executable subset of VDM was used. Further more,
even though some implicit functions and operations can actually be executed (see [7]),
the model only makes use of explicitly defined functions and operations.
3 Industrial Case: ECAP
This section gives a functional overview of the self-defense system as well as the proto-
col which is the main focus of this study. There are details of the system which cannot
be presented here due to military classification restrictions, but hopefully sufficient in-
formation is given to introduce the reader to this complex system.
3.1 Functional Overview
When fighter pilots are flying missions in hostile territory, there is a risk of encountering
enemy anti-aircraft systems. To respond to these threats, the pilot can deploy different
countermeasures. Since opposing anti aircraft systems are becoming increasingly so-
phisticated, and on-board self-defense systems are also becoming more sophisticated,
the fighter pilot is in need of assistance in choosing the optimal countermeasures strat-
egy.
A system called Electronic Combat Adaptive Processor (ECAP) has been developed
to assist the pilot in choosing the most optimal response to incoming threats. The system
is a programmable unit that provides threat adaptive processing, threat evaluation and
countermeasures strategy to counter incoming threats. From a multitude of sensor inputs
(aircraft position, orientation, speed, altitude and threat type and incoming angle to
name a few) the system chooses an effective combination of countermeasures against
the incoming threat. The different sensors attached to ECAP can detect different types
of threats, and will report data of any incoming threat of that specific type to ECAP. The
chosen threat response, which can consist of one or more countermeasure programs, is
sent to a Dispenser subsystem which administers the deployment of the correct types
of dispense payloads with the correct timing. An overview of the system can be seen in
Fig. 1.
The system can operate in two different modes; semi-automatic and automatic.
When the system is running in automatic mode, all responses are carried out without
further delay, but when the system is operating in semi-automatic mode, the pilot needs
to consent to all generated responses. When a response is generated, it is placed in a
queue and the pilot is notified. Once a consent from the pilot is received, the response
is sent to the Dispenser and removed from the queue. If multiple responses are placed
in the queue, these are sorted based on the priority of the corresponding threat.
In order to allow the dispensed countermeasures to have the expected effect, a Re-
assessment Timer (RT) keeps track of when to reassess the threat. A similar precaution
against obscuring dispensed countermeasures is an Interference Avoidance Timer (IAT)
which specifies a period of time in which a specific type of countermeasure cannot be
used in another threat response. This ensures that unwanted interference with the cur-
rent countermeasures program, which potentially could cancel the effect, is avoided.
Fig. 1. Self-defense system overview
The subsystem of interest for this paper, is a special Advanced Sensor (AS). This
sensor not only detects incoming threats, but also calculates the countermeasures needed
to avoid the threat. AS is running in parallel with the rest of the system, and relies on
ECAP to accept and execute generated threat responses. Hence, ECAP needs to check
the RT and IAT of the proposed response for conflicts, and accept/reject the response
based on this. A robust protocol has been specified, defining the communication be-
tween ECAP and AS. Initially, ECAP treated the sequence of components which a
threat response consists of separately which resulted in the need for several pilot consent
actions in order to execute a response when the system was running in semi-automatic
mode. Not only did this put unnecessary strain on the pilot, but it also resulted in delays
between the different countermeasure programs.
The main focus of this case study was an update to the way ECAP interprets mes-
sages from the AS system. The protocol itself has undergone military certification,
hence no changes to the protocol were possible, since this would involve re-certification
of the protocol, which is both a costly and time consuming task. Instead, in addition to
the individual components of the threat response, AS will also generate a compound
threat response message which is the concatenation of the sequence of components.
The only thing distinguishing a component from the compound threat response is the
position in the complete AS message – in a message of length = n, all sub-messages
[1..n-1] are components and the n’th message is the compound threat response as shown
in Fig. 2. For example, the first component could be a dispense routine using one type
of payload, the second component could be a command to a subsystem – then the com-
pound message would consist of both the dispense routine defined in the first component
and the command defined in the second component.
Fig. 2. Countermeasure components and compound threat response from AS
ECAP will still test for conflicting RT and IAT for all the components, but will
only ever execute a compound threat response. This ensures that only a single pilot
consent is ever needed, which in turn also solves the issue of unwanted delays between
countermeasure programs. At any time before the accept of the final complete threat
response, ECAP can cancel the requests from AS if another threat surpasses the AS
request, or if a higher priority threat is discovered by another subsystem. The use of
components ensures that AS knows exactly which part of the compound message is
rejected by ECAP, and it will then try to generate another effective compound threat
response not using that particular component.
The combination of RT, IAT and different levels of priority of threats coming from
different subsystems, makes the functionality of, and communication between ECAP
and AS very complex. In order to gain confidence in the proposed update, a lot of corner
cases needed to be analysed to ensure no intricate details had been ignored. Tradition-
ally, this analysis would have been done by hand which is a very time consuming and
error prone process. As an alternative, an executable model of the entire updated ECAP
system with the AS subsystem was developed and analysed using the VDM interpreter
from Overture.
3.2 Project Setup
The expansion of ECAP described above was only a small part of a larger update to
the self defense system used by the customer, including expansions to other parts of
the on-board self defense system – but only the expansion to ECAP was subject to
the research described in this paper. Traditional software development methods (mainly
Scrum [23] based on a thoroughly negotiated backlog) were used to develop the system.
The project had a very short timespan with only four months of development time with
a workforce of roughly 30 engineers. Under normal circumstances, modelling is done
prior to development, but because of the short timespan of the project, the modelling
work was done in parallel with the development of the remaining parts of the system
by a single person (the author of this paper). This was possible since the update to
the protocol interpretation was one of the last tasks of the project, which gave enough
time to finish the large task of modelling all of the ECAP system as well as the AS
functionality and the existing protocol.
4 VDM model of ECAP
This section gives an overview of selected parts of the model of the ECAP system with
the AS, using the ASCII notation of VDM. Additional sensors are also included in the
complete model, but they are omitted here for reading convenience.
Fig. 3. Class diagram of ECAP
In Fig. 3 a simplified class diagram of ECAP is given, only including the few classes
which will be presented below. The SSIn class manages all messages sent from a
subsystem to ECAP including all messages from AS. The Executer interprets all the
messages received, generates the most optimal threat response and tests for conflicts
using the RT Monitor class. All commands and messages from ECAP are sent via
SSOut to the correct subsystem, again including the AS subsystem.
4.1 System Modelling
A complete request from the AS subsystem includes all the individual countermeasure
components and the compound threat response which is a combination of the individual
components, as seen in Fig. 2. Each individual component only consists of an ID and a
message type tying it to the protocol.
Internally in ECAP, the ID of a message is mapped to a specific countermeasure
– each specifies if a pilot consent is needed before execution, the different dispense
programs engineered to counter the given threat as well as the RT and IAT. Information
like priority of the threat and optional subsystem commands are omitted in the following
description.
All commonly used types in the model are defined in the ECAP Types class, which
all other classes inherits from. This ensures that all parts of the system has the same










(cm.DispProg.Type1 <> [] => cm.IAT.Type1 > 0) and
(cm.DispProg.Type2 <> [] => cm.IAT.Type2 > 0);
 
The invariant specifies that if a certain type of dispense payload is used in the dis-
pense program, the duration of the IAT for this type of payload must be greater than
zero. The dispense program DispProg consists of a sequence of different dispense
payload types. Between each element of these sequences, a variable delay is added.
This enables the Electronic Warfare Programmer, who configures the self-defense sys-
tem, to engineer the most optimal dispense pattern to counter the threat. Either of these





public Routine = seq of RoutineStep;
public RoutineStep = nat * DispensePayload;
public DispensePayload = <Type1> | <Type2>;
 
The final part of the threat response is the definition of IAT and RT. The reassess-
ment timer RT is just a natural number specifying how long the period is, whereas a
record type is used to define IAT, with fields for each of the types of dispense payloads.
This ensures that even though there is IAT on one type of payloads, ECAP can still





Since the protocol between AS and ECAP was locked for change, only the way
ECAP interprets messages sent from AS was changed as described in Section 3. All
incoming messages from the AS subsystem are passed to IncomingAS Message in
the Executer class.
class Executer is subclass of ECAP_Types
instance variables
private AS_OutMsg : seq of AS_Msg := {};
operations
public IncomingAS_Message : AS_Msg ==> ()
IncomingAS_Message (as_msg) ==







Each of the countermeasure components in the AS message is processed by the
Executer in the operation HandleComponent. One of the tasks of this operation
is to check for conflicting RT. Once all components have been processed as described in
the protocol, a new AS Msg has been generated consisting of responses to the AS sub-
system. This message is passed to the AS subsystem using the operation AS output
in the SSout class representing all communication from ECAP to the attached subsys-
tems.
For each component the corresponding countermeasure is generated using a table,
mapping the ID to the countermeasure. Following this, the Executer checks for con-
flicting IAT and makes sure that there are enough dispense payloads left to execute
the countermeasure program. This is done in the TestDispenseAndIAT operation,
which appends a message to the output message to AS if these constraints are not ful-
filled.
private AS_ComponentReceived : Component ==> ()
AS_ComponentReceived (c) ==




then AS_OutMsg := AS_OutMsg ˆ [mk_AS_Msg(c.ID)];
 
Once the negotiation defined in the protocol results in a confirmation of the pro-
posed compound threat response, the response is executed using the operation Execute-
Response. ECAP will never execute a countermeasure component, but only the con-
catenated compound threat response.








If ECAP is operating in semi-automatic mode a pilot consent is needed before ex-
ecuting the response – hence it is placed in a queue waiting for the consent. In full-
automatic mode the response is executed directly by sending it to the Dispenser subsys-
tem and IAT and RT is added as specified in the countermeasure.
class RT_Monitor is subclass of ECAP_Types
instance variables
private RT_Map : map nat to nat := { |-> };
operations
public AddRT : Countermeasure ==> ()
AddRT (cm) ==
let t : nat = World‘timerRef.GetTime()
in
RT_Map := RT_Map munion {cm.ID |-> t + cm.RT}
pre cm.ID not in set dom RT_Map;
 
The class RT Monitor contains a mapping of response ID to their RT deadline.
When RT is added to a threat response using the AddRT operation, the ID is mapped
to the current time plus the RT period specified in the response. Time is simulated
in a custom built timer class, and is represented by a counter which is incremented
periodically. A precondition ensures that RT has not yet been specified for the given
response. Similar functionality is specified for IAT.
Periodically the RT Monitor analyses this map, and removes any thread ID for
which the deadline is up.
private PeriodicOp : () ==> ()
PeriodicOp () ==
let t : nat = World‘timerRef.GetTime()
in
for all id in set dom RT_Map
do
if RT_Map(id).Deadline <= t
then DeadlineIsUp(id);
private DeadlineIsUp : nat ==> ()
DeadlineIsUp (id) ==
(if RT_Map(id).SS_Type = <AS>
then ECAP‘Exe.AS_RT_Done(id);
RT_Map := {id} <-: RT_Map;
);
 
In addition to removing the response ID from the map when the deadline is up, the
Executer is notified when any AS generated response is removed, since according to
the protocol AS needs to be notified when RT for a response has finished. This is done
in the AS RT Done operation in the Executer class, which generates a message to the
AS subsystem.
class Executer is subclass of ECAP_Types
operations




4.2 Testing The Protocol
In order to test the new interpretation of messages from AS, a unit test framework called
VDMUnit was used (described in [5]). This framework is inspired by JUnit [2] and can
be used to set up test suites for unit and integration tests.
Fig. 4. Class diagram of VDMUnit
A TestSuite includes a sequence of instances of the class Test. Usually, these
instances are TestCases, but it is also possible to have a test suite containing other
test suites in order to create a hierarchical structure of the different unit and integration
tests. TestResult keeps a list of failed tests, which are displayed after all tests in the
test suite have executed.
The model can be exercised using public operations and functions. By using the
special operations AssertTrue and AssertFalse built into VDMUnit the model
state can be tested against the expected state. More than 20 different scenarios were
constructed, testing a lot of different combinations of ECAP system state, IAT, RT and
requests from the AS subsystem.
class SimpleTest is subclass of TestCase
instance variables
private world : World:= new World();
operations








In addition to these scenario-based tests, the VDM model was examined using the
Proof Obligation Generator [22] built into the Overture tool. The tool automatically
generates all the proof obligations which have to be discharged in order to guarantee
the internal consistency of a model. Every time a partial operation is used a proof obli-
gation is generated flagging a potential runtime error. For example, every time the head
operator returning the first element of a sequence is used, the model designer must
ensure that the sequence in not empty which would result in a undefined return value.
5 Results
In total, the complete model of ECAP and the AS subsystem consists of more than
1800 lines of VDM++ specification. In addition, more than 1500 lines of test were
created to run the many scenarios needed to exercise the new use of the protocol. Built
into the Overture tool is the ability to generate test coverage of a model, which gives
an indication of parts of the model which are exercised less than other parts. The AP
subsystem has a test coverage of 100%, meaning that every line of specification has
been exercised by the scenarios. On average, the complete model of ECAP, AP and all
other subsystems has a test coverage of 94.1%. The focus of the scenarios was on testing
the new interpretation of the protocol, and testing combinations of ECAP system state
with different AP input. This is the reason why every branch of the complete model has
not been completely covered by the tests, but only the parts of the system concerned
with the communication between ECAP and AS.
The ECAP and AS model made use of extensive logging, so at any point in time
the system state was available for post-execution analysis. The logfiles from the many
scenarios were used directly in the communication with the customer, to give a pre-
cise description of how the systems should react in the different situations. This was
a great aid in agreeing on the way ECAP should interpret the countermeasure compo-
nents and compound threat response. In addition to these logs built directly into the
model, a certain amount of logging is available in the Overture tool. The main focus
of these automatically created logs is multi-threaded models, so mainly the scheduling
of threads is logged. If this automatic logging feature was to be extended into a more
useful tool, it could be very beneficial for the Overture tool in general, since users could
avoid writing their own logging mechanism for each model.
The customer was very impressed by the extensive tests which had been carried
out on the model, and the log files from the test proved to be a great communication
tool between the customer and the systems engineers in charge of the project. The test
results also increased the confidence in the proposed solution for the development team.
For a system the size and complexity of the one presented here, it is very difficult (if
not impossible) to analyse the many combinations of system state and AS input by hand.
In addition the manual approach is very error prone, which could result in agreeing on
erroneous behaviour and not discovering critical design flaws in the protocol. The test
suite composed for this project does not ensure complete coverage of the state-space
of the system, but provided a simple framework enabling extension of other scenarios
to analyse some newly discovered corner-case. This ensured a short duration of the
iterative cycles internally in the company when new corner cases had to be tested.
For the systems engineers leading the project, this was their first experience with
formal methods, and in using executable models to specify functional requirements in
general:
”The possibility to run numerous scenarios to analyse different combina-
tions of ECAP system state and AS input was invaluable, and the rapid feed-
back from the model designer was very useful due to the time constraints of
the project. We are extremely happy with the results obtained from this case
study, which helped us in reaching an agreement with the customer within a
very limited period of time.”
The models of ECAP, AS and the protocol were developed by a single person over a
period of just two months including knowledge gathering of the systems involved. This
was only possible due to the fact that a lot of details of the real system was abstracted
away, and only the main functionality of the systems was included in the model. The
different subsystems are connected by a military standard communication bus, which
could have been modelled in detail to test package collision etc. In addition, several
subsystem commands to enable and disable various subsystems were omitted. This is
indeed one of the main advantages of using system modelling in the early phases of
system development; describe the parts of the system of interest in detail and abstract
away from any unneeded details. For example, low level implementation details of the
desired logic of various drivers is not needed to understand the overall functionality of
the system – hence abstracting away from such details helps creating more readable
models giving a better system overview.
6 Concluding Remarks
Specifying requirements of any software system can be a very arduous task, and re-
quires good communication between the customer who is the domain expert and the
software engineers developing the system. For complex systems this is even more true,
since even small misunderstandings or misinterpretations can lead to erroneous design.
An industrial case of a self-defense system used on-board fighter aircraft has been pre-
sented, where the use of an existing protocol used between the main application of
the system and an intelligent sensor attached to the system had to be changed. An exe-
cutable model was developed using the formal specification language VDM, and a volu-
minous test suite of scenario-based tests were used to exercise the model. The resulting
output was analysed, and used to reach an agreement with the customer concerning the
functional requirements of the use of the protocol.
The use of a formal model and lightweight formal methods analysis principles such
as the scenario based tests and manual inspection of the generated proof obligations
proved to be very valuable for the project. A lot of insight was gained in the function-
ality of the system in general and specifically of the new interpretation of the messages
passed between ECAP and the AS subsystem which was invaluable in reaching an
agreement with the customer. The lightweight approach to formal analysis of the model
proved to be sufficient for the problem at hand: the development team had to be con-
fident with the proposed solution, and the customer needed to be convinced that the
correct solution had been identified. It is possible to translate VDM proof obligations
automatically [25,26] to the theorem prover HOL [9] where these can be formally ver-
ified. Compared to this more strict formal approach a lot of time was saved using the
more lightweight approach with manual proof obligation inspection and scenario based
tests.
A new feature of the Overture tool is combinatorial test of models [16], which au-
tomatically generates and executes a large collection of test cases derived from trace
definitions which are templates added to a VDM specification. These trace definitions
are defined as regular expressions describing possible sequences of operation calls, and
all possible combinations of these operation calls are expanded and executed automati-
cally by the tool. This is a great tool to detect run-time errors caused by forgotten pre-
or postconditions or broken invariants. Future plans includes making use of this test
feature to better cover the large state space of the ECAP model.
All parameters of the system were modelled statically in this case study. In the real
system, an XML-based file includes all the system parameters that are used to configure
the system. Future work on this case includes parsing the data from this XML file into
the model, so it can be dynamically configured just like the real system. This is possible
due to recent extensions to the Overture IDE [17] enabling the model developer to
access functionality defined in an external jar file. Using this extension it is possible to
use a Java XML parser to parse the content of the configuration file, and access the data
from the VDM model.
Only a subset of the entire system was included in the model, which was devel-
oped in parallel with the team of engineers developing the system, and was as such
not an integrated part of the development process. For this to scale to larger modelling
tasks of complete systems, a higher degree of integration into the daily development is
needed. SCRUM was chosen based on its very agile approach to software development,
so for formal modelling to fit into this, it needs to be somewhat agile as well. Even
though they could seem like two orthogonal approaches to software development, vari-
ous discussions concerning the combination of formal and agile methods have already
taken place [21,1]. Further work is planned on a methodology integrating formal mod-
elling into agile development processes, and thereby combining the best of two different
worlds.
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